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Summary findings
There are concerns that trade reform and globalization  competing industries, it is less so for imperfectly
will increase the uncertainty that the average worker,  competitive, nontradable, or export industries. They test
especially the relatively unskilled worker, faces. The  the hypothesis using establishment-level panel data from
increased competitiveness of product markets and greater  three countries with periods of liberalization.
access to foreign inputs, the argument goes, will lead to  The data provide only mixed support for the idea that
more elastic demand for workers. This may have adverse  trade liberalization has an impact on own-wage
consequences for both labor market volatility and wage  elasticities. No consistent patterns emerge.
dispersion.  If globalization is making the lives of workers more
Fajnzylber and Maloney argue that while the case that  insecure, it is probably working through  some other
trade liberalization should increase own-wage elasticities  mechanism.
may be broadly compelling for competitive import-
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There are increasing fears that trade reform -- and globalization more generally --
will increase  the uncertainty  faced by the average worker, particularly  those with fewer
skills.  As argued  by Rodrik (1997),  the increased  competitiveness  of product  markets and
the greater access to foreign  inputs  have led to a more elastic  demand  for workers. This
leads  to greater  volatility  in the labor  market since  bad shocks  to output translate  to larger
impacts  on wages and employment  than formerly  was the case. Further, the increased
elasticity  for unskilled  workers has also been posited as contributing  to the increase  in
wage dispersion  observed  with liberalization,  and particularly  the relative  worsening of
unskilled  relative  to skilled  workers.
In the "North",  a considerable  empirical  literature  has been  devoted  to the study of
the effects  of increased  imports  of manufacturing  goods from third world countries  on the
increasing  levels  of wage  inequality  and unemployment  of the United  States and Europe.'
On the particular  issue of demand  elasticities,  Slaughter  (1997) estimated  labor demand
elasticities  for U.S. manufacturing  industries  and found that from 1960 through 1990 the
demand  for production  labor  did become  more elastic  in most industries  although  it is not
clear,  whether  increased  trade was the cause.
Among  LDCs the literature  is almost  as thin. Estimating  static  demand equations
using  micro-panel  data from Turkey,  Chinoy,  Krishna  and Mitra (1999)  find no impact  of
' Although  conflicting  results  have been obtained, standard studies  of factor  content indicate that trade
accounts  for 10 to 20 percent of the fall in demand  for unskilled  labor  (Freeman, 1995:  25).  Thus, it has
been argued that skill-biased  technological  change can explain most of the shift in demand  away from
unskilled towards skilled labor, at  least in the U.S. manufacturing industries (Berman, Bound and
Griliches,  1994).
1the liberalization  of trade on demand  elasticities. Using monthly  Brazilian  manufacturing
survey data and broadly following Slaughter, Paes de Barros, Corseuil and Gonzaga.
(1999) regress a series of sequentially  generated  coefficients  on both the own wage and
lagged  employment  on aggregate  total trade (exports  + imports)  over GDP. They find  no
impact  of trade openness  on either.  Using aggregate  manufacturing  data from Uruguay  at
the two digit level, Cassoni,  Allen  and Labadie  (1999) find a negative impact of sectoral
total trade/GDP on the lagged employment  coefficient.  While implying more rapid
adjustment, it also leads to  a  lower total own wage elasticity, the  opposite of that
predicted.
This paper first  asks whether, theoretically,  it is obvious that increased trade
should increase own wage elasticities. Though a complete model of all the predicted
effects is intractable,  we do point out where the link between the two may not be tight.
The paper then uses establishment  level data to provide consistent dynamic  estimates  of
labor demand  functions  for three Latin American  countries  across trade policy regimes.
Estimation  is done following  Arellano  and Bond's GMM  in differences  approach.  2
II. Labor  Demand  and Trade Liberalization
Trade reform might affect own wage elasticities  through at least three channels:
substitutability  of inputs, product demand  elasticities,  and the degree of collusion  in the
2 Micro- panel data offer more precise estimates of demand functions,  allow factor  prices to be taken as
exogenous,  permit compensation  for unobserved heterogeneity,  and permit distinguishing changes in
parameters  arising from firm behavior  versus the entry  end exit  of firms into the industry. Despite  those
benefits, and probably  due to the larger efforts associated  with generating micro data sets, only a small
fraction of the nearly  two hundred empirical studies  of labor demand functions reviewed  by Hamermesh
(1993) are based on establishment-level  microeconomic  data.
2industry. Two separable  questions  arise. First, what is theoretically  certain about how
each of these channels  can influence  demand  elasticities  and second,  how would trade.
reform  work through these channels.
Most intuitive  theorizing  about the first question  begins with Marshall's  demand
laws,  (formalized  in Hamermesh  1993  or Hicks  1963):
- q  = m+m?f-'
where m  is the share of  factor expenditures  in costs, a  is  the Allen elasticity of
substitution,  and il is the product demand  elasticity.  This suggests  that as the elasticity  of
substitution  with other factors  rises (the first  term) or the product-demand  elasticity  rises
(the second, "scale" effect) so does the  derived demand elasticity. However, these
formulations  assume  perfect competition  and linearly  homogeneous  cost functions.  Much
of the advance in modem trade theory has occurred at the frontier of the industrial
organization  literature  where increasing  returns to scale and collusive  behavior  are the
nornm  Further, the reduction in collusive  behavior  is one expected outcome of trade
reform  that clearly  cannot  be viewed  within  a competitive  model.
The  linkfrom product  to labor  demand  elasticities  under  imperfect  competition.
As one example of the  complications  market power introduces, Maurice and
Ferguson (1973) derived expressions  for derived factor demand under monopoly  and
without  the assumption  of linear  homogeneity  in costs:
MX2 SOOn  (1)
(7m-  qmc)
3where e  is  a term.capturing.-economies of  scale, yI is fhe  expenditure elasticity (the
proportional change in usage of the factor relative to the proportional change in total costs-
at constant factor prices), rj,n is the elasticity of marginal revenue with respect to output
and r,n  is the elasticity of marginal costs with respect to output.
As  in  Marshall's  case,  Le  Chatelier's  principle would  suggest  that  releasing
constraints on the importing of intermediate and capital inputs would lead to  increased
substitutability  of labor for other factors and therefore an increase in the first term through
the change in the Allen elasticity.
However, the product-demand elasticity no longer enters directly in the  second
"scale  effect"  term  as  it  does  in  the  competitive  case.  As  Maurice  and  Ferguson
acknowledge, it is unquestionably related to  the  difference between the  elasticities of
marginal revenue and  marginal cost  in the denominator. "However,"  they argue  "the
relation is a tenuous one, and it cannot be stated explicitly in meaningful economic terms."
Whether generally true or not, this does point out that strategic interactions among firms
may make the link less direct than we may think.  The sharply discontinuous marginal
revenue curve emerging from Krishna's (1984) model of trade  with a  domestic/foreign
duopoly is only one example.
The effect of increased competition
A vast simplification of Maurice and Ferguson's  work can offer us some insights
into the  impact of  the  third effect, increasing competition.  We return to  the  linearly
homogenous case with constant marginal  cost, which makes equation (1) above:
-71  = ma+mrP'
4Intuitively, -an m% rise  in marginal cost  due  to 'a  I%  orise  in wages is translated into
quantity along the marginal revenue curve which, given constant returns to scale, implies.
an equivalent  percentage  change  in the demand  for labor. Again,  Le Chatelier's  principle
would seem to  guarantee and increased elasticity  with access to  intermediate  inputs
through  the first term.  To see the effect  of increased  competition  and product elasticity
on  ?lmr we draw on Bresnahan's  (1989) and Porter's (1983) discussions  of "conjectural
variations"  in firm  behavior. We assume  an individual  firm  maximizes  profits:
*r=qip(q,t)-c(qi,w,Tr)  p'<Op"s  Oc'>  O,c"< O
where p(.) is the industry  demand curve which is a function of industry output q, qi
individual  firm i's  output, X is the impact of  trade liberalization, c is the firm's constant
returns to  scale cost function, and w is the vector of market given factor prices.  As
Bresnahan  notes, outside  of the competitive  model,  firms  do not have  supply  curves  in the
sense of there being  a solution  for q as a function  of p-c'(q).  Instead  price and quantity-
setting  conduct  follow  more  general  supply  relations  which  can be written  as
mr = p(q, r) +  p'(q,  t)qic(r)  = c'(qi, w, t)
where a  =  q.  The equation  can be interpreted  as  narginal cost = the "perceived"
alq t
marginal  revenue  for oligopoly models where  a  can be considered an index of the
competitiveness of oligopoly conduct. & can move from zero in the competitive case, to
H  (the Herfindahl index) for Cournot,  or  unity in the  case of  perfect  collusion or
,Dqp(,r,q)
monopoly  (Porter 1983). Since  product  demand  elasticity  q(r) =  p(r  q)q, it is likely to
be affected by any shock to the demand curve from trade reform.
5qmV'  can be found  by taking  the derivative  of marginal  revenue  with respect  to  q:
mr' = (1 + 6)p'+qi0p"
Again, since  we are working at the industry  level,  we follow  Porter (1983) in aggregating
to  the  industry level where mr,  and mr'  remain essentially unchanged except that
0 = n-'  61 and q = I, qi . Dividing mr by mr' and by q, we can express  the elasticity  of




aq  p  q  P
to allow  for non-constant  output elasticities  and solving  yields:
m  [r7[  (1 +q,p)]]  (2)
Intuitively,  how much  the elasticity  of output, and hence labor demand  rises differs  in the
oligopolistic  vs. the competitive  case depends  on whether  the percentage  rise in price with
a  1% rise in costs exceeds unity.  In the perfectly competitive  case where a = 0,  the
expression  collapses  to the elasticity  of the demand  curve and Marshall's law of derived
demand. As we move toward monopoly,  this is not necessarily  so as the denominator
suggests. It  can  be  shown that  17,r,'  is  increasing in  the  output elasticity and  in
competitiveness  where demand  elasticities  are decreasing  in q.  Higher product elasticities
and more competitive  market behavior move in this simplified  model and under some
additional  assumptions,  in the direction  of higher  derived  demand  elasticities.
6An important  exception  occurs in the case of the frequently  modeled  and estimated
isoelastic  demand curve (qf = 0).  In this case, changes  in the degree of competitiveness.
have  no impact  on derived  demand  elasticities  although  price cost margins  may  fall.
What does trade liberalization do?
Even if  effects through these channels were completely straightforward,  the
question  then arises whether or not trade liberalization  actually  leads to changes  of the
kind generally  postulated  ie greater product elasticities,  lower degrees of collusion,  and
greater substitutability  of factors.  The answer is, again, not always or maybe, not
generaUy.
Tariff  reductions that push the import  price below the monopolists'  preferred do
reduce monopolistic  control over importables  prices and, in all probability,  increase the
product  elasticity  faced  by importables  producers  (Baghwati  1965).  Quota reduction,  even
in this simplified  situation, does not always have straightforward  effect in either the
competitive  or non-competitive  cases,  particularly  when the reduction  is not complete.  As
Baghwati  noted, by virtue of merely  displacing  the home demand  curve, reducing  a quota
but not eliminating  it still leaves  the domestic  industry  facing  a downward  sloping  demand
curve. It is easy to show in the linear  case that elasticities  may rise or fall with a partial
quota reduction  depending  on the slope  of the industry  marginal  cost curve. In the case of
the isoelastic  demand  curve ( o = 0),  by definition,  shifting  in the product demand  curve
has no impact  on q unless  the reduction  is complete.'
3 An isoelastic  demand curve will show no effect,  a linear demand curve may show a decrease.  Whether
elasticities  rise or fall depends  on the shape of the supply  curve. As examples,  a 45 degree supply curve
7We may still imagine  that if the firms were not previously competitive, there might
be a reduction in market power that would raise elasticities. This is also not obvious.  As.
noted above, equation (2) shows that a partial reduction of quotas that leads to a fall in 0
in  the  isoelastic  demand  case  leaves  labor  demand  elasticities  unchanged.  More
fundamentally, Krugman again highlights the  importance of understanding the  market
structure even with the complete removal of quotas: Davidson (1984) and Rotemberg and
Saloner (1986) and implicitly  Krishna (1984) build models where because protection raises
profitability in the absence of collusion it reduces the penalty for cheating on a collusive
agreement-hence protection  may  actually  increase  competition.  Although  Krugman
admits  that  the  result  is  unsettling  and  perhaps  improbable,  quota  reduction  may
increase 9.
Leaving this  last  perverse effect  aside,  we  may console  ourselves  that  most
liberalizations  have eliminated quotas.  Yet, QRs are reincarnated in such varied guises -
anti dumping suits, voluntary export restraints, environmental controls- that it is difficult
not to assume that we really only  "partially" liberalized and hence cannot be sure of the
overall effect on product elasticities.
Non-tradeables and exportables?
It may also be important to think through the impact on perfectly competitive non-
tradeable firms for whom the primary influence of trade liberalization is to reduce input
costs. At the simplest level, if demand curves remain unchanged (which they are unlikely
with intercept  zero will dictate  no change  in elasticity,  a vertical  supply  curve an increase  in elasticity  and
a horizontal  supply  curve a decrease.
8to do in general equilibrium)  the fall in output price would ithply lower demand elasticities
along a linear demand curve. 4 For the large share of the work force in these industries,
trade liberalization  may reduce the elasticities  they face.
Firms who can now break out of the domestic market and export may in addition
face a less elastic world demand curve since there is no a priori reason to assume global
and domestic tastes are identical. The expenditure share of their  product in richer first
world incomes is probably smaller, and hence the elasticity perhaps lower. Further, the
larger external market may encourage specialization  in a product that reduces its elasticity:
a  local dinner wine becomes Penfold's  Grange; peasant tent  floor  coverings become
Persian Rugs; a traditional altiplano stimulant becomes a first world addiction.
Intermediate inputs
Finally,  the one effect that appears pretty consistently in all the above exercises is
that arising from substitution with other inputs, a.  Here again, however, some caution is
warranted in assuming that liberalization will increase substitutability.  In the case of a
lowering of tariff barriers, arguably what  is occurring is  simply a  fall in the price of
competing inputs.  But this does not imply any change in the elasticity-the effect of this
price change is exactly what the elasticity is meant to capture.  Though aY  can change with
relative prices (see Hamermesh 1993, p. 35), the direction of change is not determinate.
If quotas were completely binding, then we would expect to see a change in a.  If
not, the effect may depend on how the available inputs were allocated.  If auctioned, then
4  Since the world price must have been below the domestic  price previously, if we assume identical
demand  curves,  the domestic  industry  must now have moved  down the demand curve and hence face a
9the effect of a liberalization is to lower the price of the input and, as in the case of tariffs,
there need be no change in a.  If allocated in less transparent ways, there likely would be.
Entry and  Exit Decisions
The own  wage  elasticity workers "face"  is a  combination of  the  reallocation
decisions of continuing firms, as well as the entry/exit decisions of new or leaving firms. If
restrictions on foreign investment are lifted and firms become  more adept at comparing
labor costs and moving from country to country, the exit elasticity of wages may grow
significantly with liberalization. However, the labor demand relations estimated here and
elsewhere cannot capture this latter effect, however important.  Fajnzylber, Ribeiro and
Maloney (2000) do attempt to measure this effect.
In  sum, theory  cannot be  relied on to  clinch the case that trade  reforms  have
increased labor demand elasticities. We turn, therefore, to the empirical evidence.
Il.  Data
We work with comparable firm level data from Colombia (1977-1991), Mexico
(1984-1990), and Chile (1979-95). The data sets to be used will be those prepared in the
context of the World Bank funded project "Industrial Competition, Productivity, and Their
Relation to  Trade Regimes" (Roberts and Tybout, 1996).5 These data sets have several
advantages that set them above any other work done to date.
1.  They  have  broad  micro-level  coverage,  including  most  manufacturing
lower  elasticity.
TIn  the case of Chile,  the original data set was updated  to cover  the period  after 1986,  using infornation
10establishments with at least ten employees, and have been "cleaned" on a consistent basis.
Working at this level permits more precise estimation as well as permitting wages to  be
taken as exogenous.
2.  Panels  that  follow  firms over  time  permit  studying  the  dynamics of  the
employment adjustment process.  They also provide lagged values to serve as instruments
for potentially endogenous variables.  Finally, they permit controlling for the existence of
plant-specific effects that may be correlated with explanatory variables.
3. The data sets provide consistent coverage across 3 countries in Latin America:
Chile, Colombia, Mexico.  Our maximum span is 17 years for Chile.  Though Slaughter's
U.S. series permitted the estimated substitution elasticities to evolve over several decades
of trade integration, our data spans periods of dramatic changes in trade regimes.  We deal
with  one  case of  extreme  liberalization (Mexico) and  two  of  renewed  protectionism
followed by re-liberalization.
Mexico: 1984-1990
In 1985, the De la Madrid government undertook a restructuring of the external
sector preceded in magnitude only by Chile's reforms of the mid 1970s. (Lustig  1992,
Maloney and Azevedo 1995) Import licensing was cut to a quarter of previous levels while
maximum import tariffs fell 50% and became more unified.  The liberalization process
would continue under NAFTA into the 1  990s.  The initial liberalization was accompanied
by  a  sharp  depreciation  of  the  real  exchange rate  which  mitigated  the  reduction  in
protection.  Over the course of the early 1990s, a steady appreciation would lead to  an
provided  by the Instituto  Nacional  de Estadistica  (Santiago,  Chile).
11increasing competitive pressure qn the,tradeables sector.  Although the bulk of the reforms
had been taken before our sample begins, arguably the impact was worked out  exactly.
over our period of study.
Chile: 1979-1995:
In the context of wide ranging and profound  structural reforms, Chile gradually
reduced tariffs to  a  uniform 10% across industries by  1979. From  1976 to  1982, the
industrial sector was majorly restructured both in terms of product  mix, and shedding of
labor.  The  period  we  analyze ranges  from  1982 to  1995  a  period  in  which  the
restructuring was largely complete, but which saw dramatic reversal in the protection that
domestic firms would face.  First, with the collapse of the currency peg in July of 1982,
the currency depreciated  almost 60% by  1985. Second,  in March  of  1983 tariffs were
doubled to 20% and then raised to 35% in September  1984.  They were eased back to
30% in March of  1985, 20% three months later where they stayed for two  years until
January 1988 when they were reduced to 15%.
The finally reduction to  11% in June 1991 came on top of a rapid appreciation of
the exchange rate  of 22% from  1989-95.  Arguably, the period of  1983-1988,  was a
period of relatively high protection compared either to the period the came before, or that
after 1990.
Colombia: 1977-1991
The  1970s were  characterized by fairly liberal trade  environment.  QRs  were
steadily reduced reaching their low point in 1980 when 69% of all commodities did not
12require import licenses. Nominal tariffs fell from dn average of 46% in 1973 to 31.8% in
1974 then reached 26.9% in 1980.
A declining  real exchange rate and a worsening trade deficit led to a tendency  to
reverse trade liberalization in 1981 that sharply accelerated between  1983-1985.  Only
36% of commodities were classified in the free import category, down from 69% in 1980
and the share would fall through 1984 when only 5% of all commodities freely imported,
83%  required licenses and 16.5% were prohibited.  Nominal tariffs rose to over 55%  in
1983.
A gradual process of liberalization began in 1985.  The Plan Vallejo liberalized
imports of intermediate and capital goods and 1988 saw again a sharp reduction in overall
tariffs.  1990 saw an even sharper measures with the virtual elimination of the licensing
regime and a cutting of average tariffs also by roughly half.  However the actual reduction
in protection to  Colombian industry is difficult to  measure.  From  1983 to  1991, the
exchange rate depreciated by roughly 50%, arguably leaving the level of protection in
1990 similar to that previous.  Looking at a crude measure of nominal tariff movements
ER movements, substantial lowering of protection only occurs in 1990 and 1991 (Roberts
1996 p 228, Ocampo and Villar 1992).
IV. Dynamic Panel Modeling
The theoretical discussion above does not  leave us with  a particular functional
form  to  estimate so  we  depart  from  a  reasonably standard  log  linear  autoregressive
specification (see Hammermesh 1993, Sevestre and Trognon 1996):
13lit =  al(,  - I) + wit7(0(r),  r) + ylqt + /h +  a +  ,it
The log of employment in firm i in period t  is a function of lagged employment, a vector
of the logs of the skilled and unskilled wages in the firm (wi),  and industry output (to
capture cyclical effects), time varying levels effects that affect all firms equally, individual
'fixed"  effects, and  a  random error  term.  Firm level output  is omitted  since we  are
interested both in substitution effects conditional on output and output effects of a change
in wages. Unfortunately, the standard OLS  techniques for approaching the individual
effects, random effects or fixed effects estimators, are not consistent in this context.  The
assumption of a lack of correlation between p[t and the explanatory variables required for
variable effects estimator  is not  defensible in this  context  since both  lt and  l-i  are a
function of Iii. OLS is clearly inconsistent and FGLS is also should the errors show either
heteroskedasticity or  serial correlation (Sevestre and Trognon  102). Further, the  usual
elimination  of pi by subtracting off the time mean induces a negative correlation between
the transformed error  and the lagged dependent variables of order  l/T,  which, in short
panels such as those used here remains substantial.
If at least one of the explanatory variables is truly exogenous, Balestra and Nerlove
(1966), its lags can be used as instruments and will yield consistent estimates.  However,
in the present case, it is difficult to assume that either wages, or output are uncorrelated
with [L. As an example, larger output firms tend to  use more sophisticated production
techniques. These also require a more reliable or skilled work force which will show up as
14receiving a higher wage. 6 Both output and the observed wage are therefore correlated
with the unobserved "sophistication"  of the production technology.
Following  Anderson and  Hsiao  (1982),  we  therefore  difference the  data  to
eliminate Iii,  yielding our base specification
Unless the idiosyncratic  error followed  a random walk, this differencing  necessarily gives
Alit = aAlA(t  - I)  + Awitq(9(r),  r) +  VAqt  + AS  + A4it
the transformed error an MA(+) structure that is correlated with the differenced LDV.
This can be overcome by using lags of  greater than t-4  as instruments.  We follow
Arellano and Bond 's (1991) employment of additional lags as instruments to improve the
efficiency  of the estimates in a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) context.
We instrument lagged  differenced employment with its lag and with second and further
lags of capital stocks or output. Though we attempted to  instrument for any remaining
endogeneity in wages, the results, as with Roberts and Skoufias and Maloney and Ribeiro,
were poor and counterintuitive and in the end we do not instrument for them.  As we
instrument lagged differenced employment  with its lag, we lose three years of data in each
panel. This is not so much of a problem in Colombia where the sample begins substantially
before the change in regime. In Mexico  we lose 1984-86, the period when most reforms
were  occurring.  However,  the  full  impact  of  these  changes  was  probably  not
instantaneous  and  the  exchange  rate  appreciated  sharply across  the  period  so  the
experiment is still of interest.  The Chilean data now begins in 1982, the last year of the
6 This does not imply lack of competitiveness in product markets.  Firms take the wage for workers of all
combinations of  characteristics they desire.  Since we do not observe these characteristics, the firm may
15extremely open trade regime -before the economic collapse. The several year period of
greater protectionism that followed and then the re-liberalization after  make this period.
interesting.
Measures of openness:
1.  Changes in Regime: (Tariff Rate, Real Exchange Rate, License Coverage) Changing
tariff or quota regimes therefore has some advantages. As the proliferation of anti-
dumping cases testifies, these may still understate the true degree of protection.  Since
real exchange rate movements also constitute protection, we include them as "regime"
variables
2.  Realized  trade flows:  (Import Penetration Index, Export  content  of  Production.)
Though seemingly logical measures of increased integration, these measures have two
disadvantages. First, theoretically, it is not necessary for trade to actually occur for the
domestic agent's behavior to  change, the threat is enough (Bhagwati, 1965).  Hence
very small or no observed imports may nonetheless be associated with large changes in
industrial structure. Second, customary measures of competition are extremely noisy.
In Chile, the data after  1986 do not*  have a sectoral identification code and hence
these variables cannot be calculated.
3.  Observed  Competitiveness: (price-cost  margin).  This measure  of  monopoly rents
appear to be paying  more for the workers.
16proxies  for  the  degree  of  monopoly  power.  Empirically,  Harrison  (1994)  and
Levinsohn  (1993)  argued  that  observed  falls  in  price-cost  margins  following
liberalization  imply more elastic product demand.
In the estimations, these variables are included free standing and as interactive variables on
the relevant elasticity. This provides for a more direct testing procedure than that used by
Slaughter who collected the elasticities in a panel and then regressed  them on various
openness measures leaving unclear what the standard errors would be.
VI. Results
Following Arellano and  Bond,  tables  1-6 present  the  results  of  the  difference
dynamic GMM estimations.  Preliminary exploration using the Blundell and Bond (1998)
systems estimator generated countertuitive results, in particular very high adjustment lags,
so we remain with the difference specification (See Fajnzylber and Maloney, 2000).  The
variables are listed across the top of each table: lagged employment, contemporaneous and
lagged  blue  collar  wages,  contemporaneous  and  lagged  white  collar  wage  and,  for
Colombia and Mexico, the industry value added. Since the Chilean data does not include
industry identification in the entire sample, we exclude the industry value added term. The
diagnostics reported are those of Arellano and Bond: the Sargan test for overidentifying
restrictions, implicitly  a test of specification, and tests for second order serial correlation.
To  begin, we  include yearly  dummies and  interactive terms  on  all variables,
reported  in the column below each variable.  This is the most  straightforward way of
testing for structural break in the labor demand equations across time.  Wald tests, both on
17whether the set of dunmmies  for a any given year is significant (Specification Wald), and
whether the set of timne  dummies on any particular variable is significant (Variable Wald),
are reported in the penultimate column and in the last row respectively. It is necessary to
recall that by definition of the 5% level of confidence, there is a 50% chance that ten time
dummies will generate at least one rejection of the null of no change where there is, in
fact, no structural break.  Throughout the discussion we refer to the absolute value of the
own wage elasticities i.e., -.5 is greater than -.3.  The calculation of the long run elasticity
is standard:  the sum of the impact elasticities (coefficients on the contemporaneous and
lagged wage) divided by unity minus the coefficient on lagged employment.
The difference GMM specifications are largely satisfactory.  For all countries, the
Sargan tests are of acceptable values and the presence of second order serial correlation is
rejected.  The base specifications for each country offer plausible values for the long run




Table 1 suggests that there is little evidence of structural break in the blue collar
specification.  There  is a  high variance in the  calculated long run own wage  elasticity
ranging from .085 to .641.  This suggests that any estimates of demand elasticities depend
on the sample period chosen and that  comparisons of elasticities across countries must
bear this in mind.  The significant breaks in the  short run elasticity occur in  1986 and
1990-1992, however  it moves counterintuitively toward  being more elastic in  1986, a
18period of more protection, and it is difficult  to explain why the short run elasticities would
get larger in 1990-92 and then revert to their previous values thereafter as Chilean industry
faces a more competitive  environment.  The Wald tests serve as a measure of the break in
the  long run elasticity and show  break only in  1986 and  1989 and do  not  suggest a
consistent movement in line with Rodrik's theory.
White collar workers do show a provocative consistent structural break in the long
run elasticity from 1987-1989, a period of arguably greater protection.  Yet all three LR
elasticities become greater in absolute value rather than lower.  The variable Wald tests
suggests that there are significant  time effects in the own wage.
Colombia
In table 3, the  specification Wald tests  for Colombia also  show no  consistent
pattern of structural break although sporadic breaks occur in 1984, 1985 and 1988.  In
the  first case, none of the dummies on the components of the LR  own elasticity are
significant,  and in the second, the short run elasticity become larger in a period of greater
protection. Individual  dummies on the contemporaneous own wage  are significant in
1988-1989, but there is no obvious correlation with policy change.  Though the long run
own wage elasticity does appear larger in 1991, a period of increased liberalization, the
Wald test does not suggest significance.
Table 4 shows that neither the specification  Wald tests or the coefficient Wald tests
suggest  any  break  in  the  white  collar  specification and  no  individual dummies are
significant.
19Mexico
For blue collar workers,  table  5 shows sharp breaks  in the coefficients on the
contemporaneous  wage  in  the  direction  predicted  with  liberalization.  However,  the
specification Wald test find no overall structural break and despite larger LR elasticities in
1988 and  1989, the  reverse is true  in  1990, a  period  of greater  liberalization and  an
appreciating exchange rate.  The variable Wald tests  also suggest  no  significant break
except for the constant.
Table 6 suggests,  again, no  evidence of  significant overall specification change
although all LR own elasticities are higher in the more open period.  The variable Wald
test shows significance  only for the constant and industry value added.
In sum, there is no strong evidence from these regressions that liberalization has
led to greater LR own wage elasticities.
Openness Proxies
Tables 7-12 present the results of the same specification, but adding to  the time
dummies  explicit  measures  of  liberalization described  above.  Most  variables  were
included both  free standing and as interactive variables with the  exception of economy
wide variables which had no cross sectional variation.
Chile:
In the trade policy specification, both the interactive terms on the tariff rate and the
real exchange rates show significance on either the contemporaneous or lagged own wage
coefficient,  and  the  variable  Wald  tests  show  marginal  significance.  However,
20counterintuitively, higher tariff  protection  appears  to  raise  the  elasticity as  does  a
depreciation of the exchange rate.  A higher price cost margin appears to  affect the
specification at a high level of statistical significance  but has no effect on the own wage
coefficients.  Counterintuitively, rising profit margins are correlated with a significant  rise
in the coefficient on lagged employment  and thus with a higher long run own elasticity.
For white collar workers, table 8 suggests that a depreciation of the real exchange
rate has the counterintuitive effect of increasing the own wage elasticity with both the
specification and variable Wald tests strongly significant. Price cost margins do not have
significant  effects on either the short nor the long run employment response to own wage
changes.
In sum, there is little evidence of more openmess  leading to higher long run own
wage elasticities.
Colombia:
Among the trade policy variables, only the real exchange rate has an effect on the
blue collar elasticity and in the direction predicted. Both the combined coefficients on the
own wage and the reduction in the coefficient on lagged employment move to reduce the
long run elasticity.  This effect is supported again in the trade flows specification.  Here
however, increased imports  counter-intuitively appear to shorten the adjustment period
and reduce the long run elasticity. Increased exports do seem to lead to higher short run
and long run elasticities.  The price cost margin lengthens the adjustment period with the
effect of increasing the long run own elasticity.
For  white collar  workers,  the  only  significant coefficient in  the  trade  policy
21specification is  that  on  the  lagged  dependent  variable-a more  depreciated  currency
decreases long run own elasticity.  In the trade flows specification, both increased exports
and imports do decrease the short run own elasticity although the specification Wald tests
are only marginally significant. The statistically significant increase in the coefficient on
lagged employment has the impact of increasing the long  run  elasticity as price cost
margins rise.
Overall, Colombia provides some evidence in favor of the Rodrik hypothesis, but
the results are still highly  mixed.
Mexico:
For  blue  collar  workers,  product  tariffs  have  an  indeterminate  effect,
counterintuitively increasing the  short  run  elasticities but  reducing  the  coefficient on
lagged employment. Evaluated at the variable means, an increase in tariffs of one standard
deviation lowers the demand elasticities as predicted.  In Mexico, the data also allow for
the construction of a variable for protection of inputs.  The impact of higher input tariffs is
also indeterminate but when evaluated at the variable means, a  one standard deviation
increase in tariffs leads to a lowering of elasticities. As section II argues, theoretically, it is
not obvious that this should be the case but the finding  is broadly consistent with Rodrik's
argument.  Neither  the  non-trade  barriers variable nor  the  real  exchange rate  appear
significantly. Increased imports do appear to have the predicted effect on the short and
long run  elasticities although the  specification Wald test  is not  significant.  The  real
exchange rate again does not affect short run own wage elasticities but by decreasing the
coefficient  on  lagged  employment, it  effectively does  reduce  the  total  elasticity  as
22predicted. As for price cost margins, they have no significant effects on either the short
run or the long run elasticity.
For  white collar workers,  no  tariff variable has any  impact on  the own  wage
elasticities although the exchange rate has the opposite of the predicted effect through the
lagged own wage.  No trade flow variable has any impact, but the real exchange rate does
have the predicted effect here through reducing the coefficient on lagged employment.
Further, non-trade barriers do decrease long run elasticities through  the  coefficient on
lagged employment. Increased  prices cost  margins appear  to  increase the  own  wage
elasticity.
Conclusions
This paper has argued that the case that trade liberalization should increase own
wage elasticities, while compelling in the case of competitive import competing industries,
is perhaps less so in the frequent case of imperfectly competitive, non-tradeable, or even
export industries.  It has then tested  the hypothesis using establishment level panel data
from three countries with periods of liberalization.
The results show that estimates of elasticities do change greatly in magnitude, if
not  significantly so, across time and that comparisons across countries should take this
into account when attempting to make inference about the flexibility or efficiency of labor
markets.  But more importantly, the data provide only very mixed support for the idea that
trade  liberalization has  an impact on own wage elasticities and  no  consistent patterns
emerge.  If globalization is making the lives of workers more  insecure, it is probably
working through some other mechanism than that examined here.
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26Appendix I. Notes on the Fundamental Law of Labor Demand
The "Fundamental Law of Labor Demand"(FLFD) 7  used in most discussions of
the topic is generally derived from the cost function. Since we are interested in the impact
of an economy wide rise in  labor costs,  as opposed  to  idiosyncratic ones,  we  follow
Hamermesh in aggregating to the industry level.  From Shepherd's lemma applied to  any
homothetic cost function:
I  = cw k*  = c,  a=  CCwI/CwCr  Cww = -(r/w)Cwr  (1)
and take the derivative with respect to the wage
aL  = qwaq  aP  2
-=  qcwW+--Cw
ap ac
By equations (1) this can be rewritten
AL = rk aL  aq ap  L2
- q wc  o  ac q2
multiplying  both sides by w/L yields
rk  wL
77= -- k  a+  -w  c  = -(1-  m)a  - m ?7qc
cq  cq
where  m  is  labor's  share  in  costs,  and  a  is  the  Allen constant  output  elasticity of
substitution which measures the ease of substitution among factors when the only possible
adjustment to a rise in a factor's price by changing relative use of factors. The expression
differs  from  the  FLFD  only  to  the  degree  l7qc ￿  77.
7 Hamermesh  (1993)  p 27
27Table 1: Industry  Labor  Demand  for Blue Collar Workers in Chile (1982-95)
(standard errors  in parenthesis)
Ln L t-I  Ln WBt  Ln WBt-  1  Ln WWt  Ln WWt-  1  Constant  Wald  L.R.  Sargan  Autoco.  No. Obs
Test: p-  Elast.(a)  Test  Test  (Plants)
value(b)  (2nd o.)
Base  0.381(*)  -0.244(*)  0.068(*)  0.041(*)  -0.006  -0.179(*)  --  -0.285  0.972  0.695  21014
Specification(c)  (0.095)  (0.015)  (0.023)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.010)  (1501)
Time Variant  0.627  -0.169(*)  0.112  0.071(*)  -0.034  -0.176(*)  --  -0.153  0.660  0.811  21014
Specification  (0.475)  (0.043)  (0.105)  (0.027)  (0.039)  (0.021)  (1501)
Variable* T83  -0.533  -0.072  -0.104  -0.001  0.036  0.142(*)  0.442  -0.257
(0.531)  (0.048)  (0.116)  (0.032)  (0.046)  (0.038)
Variable* T84  0.607  -0.009  0.193  -0.103(**)  -0.046  0.316(*)  0.159  -0.545
(0.572)  (0.067)  (0.126)  (0.045)  (0.055)  (0.033)
Variable* T85  0.224  -0.068  0.029  -0.051  0.049  0.143(**)  0.199  -0.641
(0.853)  (0.067)  (0.163)  (0.038)  (0.048)  (0.067)
Variable* T86  -0.707  -0.106(***)  -0.253(***)  -0.036  0.059  0.223(*)  0.043  -0.385
(0.607)  (0.061)  (0.135)  (0.034)  (0.045)  (0.028)
Variable* T87  -1.108(***)  -0.031  -0.193  -0.038  0.032  0.284(*)  0.111  -0.190
(0.663)  (0.077)  (0.142)  (0.034)  (0.046)  (0.034)
Variable* T88  -0.596  -0.067  -0.153  0.007  0.054  0.244(*)  0.666  -0.286
(0.499)  (0.059)  (0.116)  (0.033)  (0.044)  (0.025)
Variable* T89  -0.289  -0.110  0.025  -0.072(**)  0.006  0.214(*)  0.012  -0.215
(0.568)  (0.070)  (0.126)  (0.037)  (0.053)  (0.028)
Variable* T90  -0.313  -0.130(***)  -0.060  -0.012  0.058  0.180(*)  0.243  -0.360
(0.568)  (0.075)  (0.142)  (0.036)  (0.043)  (0.032)
Variable* T91  -0.694  -0.123(**)  -0.125  -0.036  0.038  0.205(*)  0.108  -0.286
(0.501)  (0.061)  (0.121)  (0.033)  (0.042)  (0.023)
Variable* T92  -0.027  -0.138(**)  0.012  -0.004  0.057  0.215(*)  0.177  -0.457
(0.558)  (0.067)  (0.140)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.024)
Variable* T93  -0.156  -0.025  0.038  -0.065(***)  -0.022  0.176(*)  0.167  -0.085
(0.888)  (0.058)  (0.226)  (0.040)  (0.061)  (0.044)
Variable* T94  0.981  -0.056  0.136  -0.027  -0.002  0.149(*)  0.930  -0.037
(1.638)  (0.089)  (0.292)  (0.059)  (0.076)  (0.040)
Variable* T95  0.192  -0.069  0.012  -0.053  0.005  0.168(*)  0.780  -0.634
(1.213)  (0.088)  (0.235)  (0.046)  (0.072)  (0.024)
Wald Test (d)  0.120  0.591  0.044  0.158  0.431  0.000
Notes: GMM estimates  with first-differenced  data. All variables  are assumed  exogenous  except for  lagged employment.  Instruments are based  on second  and further lags
of employment  and output. (*) Significant  at the 1% level.  (**) Significant  at the 5% level. (***) Significant  at the 10% level. (a) Best point estimates  calculated  as [(Ln
WBt + Ln WBt-  I )/ Ln Lt-1  I.  (b) Wald  Test of Joint Significance  of the variables  interacted  with a given year dummy.  (c) Time dummies  were included but are here
omitted  (d) P. Values. Wald Test of Joint Significance  of year dummies  interacted  with a given variable.Table 2: Industry  Labor  Demand  for WhiteCollar  Workers  in Chile (1982-95)
(Lstandard  errors  in parenthesis)
Ln L t-1  Ln WBt  Ln WBt-  1  Ln WWt  Ln WWt-  1  Constant  Wald  L.R.  Sargan  Autoco.  No. Obs
Test: p-  Elast.(a)  Test  Test  (Plants)
value(b)  (2nd o.)
Base  0.248(*)  0.032(**)  -0.032(**)  -0.376(*)  0.108(*)  -0.074(*)  -0.357  0.221  0.795  21014
Specification(c)  (0.045)  (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.018)  (0.013)  (1501)
Time Variant  0.262(***)  0.019  -0.032  -0.289(*)  0.099(***)  -0.070(*)  --  -0.258  0.213  0.599  21014
Specification  (0.153)  (0.049)  (0.045)  (0.032)  (0.054)  (0.020)  (1501)
Variable*  T83  -0.032  0.008  -0.006  -0.054  -0.017  -0.014  0.899  -0.339
(0.170)  (0.063)  (0.062)  (0.043)  (0.068)  (0.030)
Variable*  T84  -0.103  -0.016  -0.008  -0.009  -0.026  0.098(*)  0.991  -0.268
(0.254)  (0.067)  (0.065)  (0.045)  (0.093)  (0.028)
Variable*  T85  0.028  0.012  0.003  -0.114(**)  -0.012  0.049(***)  0.408  -0.446
(0.240)  (0.071)  (0.059)  (0.052)  (0.082)  (0.027)
Variable*  T86  -0.122  0.054  0.093  -0.096(**)  0.007  0.168(*)  0.110  -0.325
(0.232)  (0.074)  (0.074)  (0.049)  (0.090)  (0.024)
Variable*  T87  -0.102  0.122(***)  0.007  -0.168(*)  -0.009  0.159(*)  0.007  -0.438
(0.218)  (0.070)  (0.070)  (0.049)  (0.085)  (0.027)
Variable*  T88  -0.104  0.110  0.042  -0.145(*)  -0.036  0.156(*)  0.050  -0.442
(0.180)  (0.069)  (0.067)  (0.049)  (0.079)  (0.026)
Variable*  T89  0.282  -0.076  -0.131(***)  -0.194(*)  0.153  0.108(*)  0.003  -0.506
(0.282)  (0.073)  (0.070)  (0.051)  (0.119)  (0.034)
Variable*  T90  -0.069  -0.031  0.014  -0.094(***)  0.002  0.105(*)  0.469  -0.349
(0.244)  (0.079)  (0.061)  (0.050)  (0.105)  (0.026)
Variable*  T91  -0.095  0.005  0.018  -0.082(***)  -0.012  0.106(*)  0.627  -0.341
(0.219)  (0.068)  (0.060)  (0.047)  (0.087)  (0.023)
Variable*  T92  0.004  0.006  0.019  -0.065  -0.001  0.102(*)  0.862  -0.349
(0.261)  (0.065)  (0.061)  (0.050)  (0.100)  (0.024)
Variable*  T93  0.173  -0.006  -0.069  -0.047  0.103  0.105(*)  0.715  -0.239
(0.251)  (0.074)  (0.069)  (0.056)  (0.099)  (0.025)
Variable*  T94  0.008  -0.074  -0.049  -0.027  0.020  0.101(*)  0.844  -0.270
(0.228)  (0.068)  (0.070)  (0.049)  (0.089)  (0.024)
Variable*  T95  0.297  -0.066  0.025  -0.090  0.122  0.056(**)  0.499  -0.359
(0.369)  (0.080)  (0.067)  (0.060)  (0.125)  (0.028)
Wald  Test (d)  0.970  0.204  0.474  0.003  0.973  0.000
Notes: GMM  estimates  with first-differenced  data. All variables  are assumed  exogenous  except for lagged  employment.  Instruments  are based  on second  and further lags
of employment  and output. (*) Significant  at the 1% level. (**) Significant  at the 5% level. (***) Significant  at the 10% level. (a) Best  point estimates  calculated  as [(Ln
WBt  + Ln WBt-l )/ Ln Lt-l ]. (b) Wald Test of Joint Significance  of the variables  interacted  with a given year dummy. (c) Time dummies  were included but are here
omitted  (d) P. Values. Wald Test of Joint Significance  of year dummies  interacted with a given variable.Table 3: Industry  Labor  Demand  for Blue Collar Workers  in Colombia  (1980-91)
(standard  errors in parenthesis)
Ln L t-I  Ln WBt  Ln WBt-l  Ln WWt  Ln WWt-I  Ln Industry  Constant  Wald  L.R.  Sargan  Autoco.  No. Obs
Value  Test: p-  Elast.(a)  Test  Test  (Plants)
Added  value(b)  (2nd o.)
Base  0.215(*)  -0.424(*)  0.037  0.074(*)  0.011  0.054(*)  -0.005  --  -0.493  0.311  0.312  22992
Specification(c)  (0.080)  (0.028)  (0.035)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.013)  (0.009)  (1916)
Time Variant  0.159  -0.453(*)  -0.051  0.118(*)  -0.001  0.01  1(*)  0.004  --  -0.599  0.386  0.929  22992
Specification  (0.316)  (0.053)  (0.094)  (0.024)  (0.018)  (0.023)  (0.018)  (1916)
Variable* T81  -0.149  0.090  0.064  -0.058(***)  0.011  0.010  -0.013  0.094  -0.353
(0.302)  (0.060)  (0.100)  (0.032)  (0.028)  (0.039)  (0.019)
Variable* T82  -0.021  -0.065  0.058  -0.030  0.036  -0.011  0.024  0.488  -0.593
(0.369)  (0.089)  (0.124)  (0.037)  (0.028)  (0.035)  (0.020)
Variable* T83  0.032  -0.051  0.129  -0.087(**)  0.018  0.060  -0.013  0.154  -0.525
(0.573)  (0.098)  (0.250)  (0.037)  (0.041)  (0.038)  (0.022)
Variable* T84  -0.176  0.011  0.031  -0.066(***)  0.058(**)  0.092(*)  -0.013  0.008  -0.454
(0.334)  (0.064)  (0.108)  (0.035)  (0.027)  (0.035)  (0.019)
Variable* T85  0.830  -0.199(**)  0.346  0.004  -0.017  0.215(*)  -0.081(*)  0.025  -32.194
(0.665)  (0.098)  (0.273)  (0.052)  (0.051)  (0.062)  (0.020)
Variable* T86  -0.482  0.049  -0.157  -0.058  0.017  0.020  -0.033  0.702  -0.463
(0.524)  (0.089)  (0.266)  (0.057)  (0.080)  (0.068)  (0.028)
Variable* T87  0.625  0.150  0.355  -0.107(***)  -0.023  -0.019  0.020  0.281  0.005
(0.817)  (0.095)  (0.329)  (0.057)  (0.075)  (0.049)  (0.022)
Variable* T88  -0.036  0.137(***)  0.094  -0.052  0.048  -0.007  -0.023  0.058  -0.311
(0.359)  (0.081)  (0.114)  (0.040)  (0.035)  (0.050)  (0.020)
Variable* T89  0.366  0.200(***)  0.170  -0.058  -0.028  -0.050  -0.007  0.569  -0.281
(0.532)  (0.108)  (0.194)  (0.043)  (0.050)  (0.069)  (0.020)
Variable* T90  0.091  0.156  0.062  -0.067  0.034  0.081  -0.019  0.214  -0.382
(0.444)  (0.106)  (0.130)  (0.045)  (0.040)  (0.077)  (0.021)
Variable* T91  -0.040  0.058  -0.017  -0.035  0.034  0.086  -0.032  0.432  -0.525
(0.334)  (0.078)  (0.103)  (0.044)  (0.042)  (0.054)  (0.020)
Wald  Test: p-  0.732  0.049  0.698  0.505  0.667  0.001  0.000
value(d)
Notes: GMM estimates  with first-differenced  data. All variables  are assumed  exogenous  except for lagged  employment.  Instruments are based  on the second  and furiher
lags of employment  and capital stocks.  (*) Significant  at the 1% level. (**)  Significant  at the 5% level. (***) Significant  at the 10% level. (a) Best point estimates
calculated  as [(Ln  WBt + Ln WBt-1 )/ Ln Lt-l ]. (b) Wald  Test of Joint Significance  of the variables interacted  with a given year dummy.  (c) Time dummies  were
included  but are here omitted  (d) Wald Test of Joint Significance  of year dummies  interacted  with a given variable.Table 4: Industry Labor  Demand  for WhiteCollar  Workers  in Colombia  (1980-91)
(standard  errors  in parenthesis)
Ln L t-l  Ln WBt  Ln WBt-1  Ln WWt  Ln WWt-l  Ln Industry  Constant  Wald  L.R.  Sargan  Autoco.  No. Obs
Value  Test: p-  Elast.(a)  Test  Test  (Plants)
Added  value(b)  (2nd o.)
Base  0.290(*)  -0.028(**)  0.009  -0.307(*)  0.095(*)  0.039(*)  0.007  --  -0.299  0.354  0.752  22992
Specification(c)  (0.061)  (0.013)  (0.010)  (0.016)  (0.021)  (0.013)  (0.010)  (1916)
Time Variant  0.321(***)  -0.051  0.015  -0.340(*)  0.124  -0.917  0.089  - -0.319  0.212  0.705  22992
Specification  (0.174)  (0.050)  (0.044)  (0.054)  (0.084)  (1.185)  (0.102)  (1916)
Variable* T81  -0.261  -0.029  -0.029  0.028  -0.113  0.959  -0.072  0.898  -0.321
(0.201)  (0.059)  (0.051)  (0.059)  (0.093)  (1.184)  (0.102)
Variable* T82  0.071  -0.025  -0.007  -0.029  -0.030  0.933  -0.046  0.959  -0.452
(0.279)  (0.062)  (0.062)  (0.071)  (0.109)  (1.191)  (0.102)
Variable* T83  -0.085  0.016  -0.031  -0.007  0.001  0.960  -0.084  0.914  -0.294
(0.260)  (0.061)  (0.056)  (0.068)  (0.111)  (1.188)  (0.102)
Variable* T84  -0.230  0.076  0.023  0.066  -0.081  0.986  -0.084  0.494  -0.255
(0.239)  (0.063)  (0.054)  (0.066)  (0.105)  (1.185)  (0.102)
Variable* T85  0.353  -0.547  -0.486  -0.318  0.310  5.689  -0.309  0.765  -2.590
(0.556)  (0.728)  (0.569)  (0.396)  (0.508)  (5.740)  (0.268)
Variable*  T86  0.074  0.030  0.029  0.026  0.006  0.929  -0.062  0.916  -0.304
(0.291)  (0.118)  (0.116)  (0.089)  (0.113)  (1.734)  (0.150)
Variable*  T87  -0.234  -0.015  0.012  0.023  -0.045  2.868  -0.087  0.951  -0.260
(0.408)  (0.203)  (0.102)  (0.282)  (0.207)  (5.573)  (0.146)
Variable*  T88  -0.038  0.053  0.016  0.072  -0.043  0.324  -0.032  0.866  -0.262
(0.340)  (0.082)  (0.057)  (0.097)  (0.123)  (1.775)  (0.125)
Variable*  T89  -0.066  0.207  0.074  -0.020  -0.052  -3.158  0.046  0.933  -0.386
(0.485)  (0.251)  (0.191)  (0.146)  (0.196)  (6.811)  (0.228)
Variable*  T90  0.295  0.337  0.121  0.298  0.229  -1.741  0.065  0.752  0.807
(0.506)  (0.238)  (0.126)  (0.217)  (0.237)  (2.480)  (0.157)
Variable*  T91  0.450  0.020  -0.063  0.092  0.162  0.565  -0.084  0.727  0.164
(0.509)  (0.144)  (0.070)  (0.179)  (0.151)  (2.647)  (0.104)
Wald Test:  p-  0.615  0.815  0.891  0.884  0.607  0.980  0.000
value(d)
Notes: GMM estimates  with first-differenced  data. All variables  are assumed  exogenous  except for lagged  employment.  Instruments  are based on the second  and further
lags of employment  and capital stocks.  (*) Significant  at the 1% level.  (**) Significant  at the 5% level. (***) Significant  at the 10% level.  (a) Best point estimates
calculated  as [(Ln WBt + Ln WBt-l )/ Ln Lt-I ]. (b) Wald Test of Joint Significance  of the variables  interacted with a given year dummy.  (c) Time dummies  were
included  but are here omitted  (d) Wald  Test of Joint Significance  of year dummies  interacted  with a given variable.Table 5: Industry  Labor Demand  for Blue Collar Workers in Mexico  (1987-90)
(standard  errors  in parenthesis)
Ln L t-1  Ln WBt  Ln WBt-  1  Ln WWt  Ln WWt-  I  Ln Industry  Constant  Wald  L.R.  Sargan  Autoco.  No. Obs
Value  Test: p-  Elast.(a)  Test  Test  (Plants)
Added  value(b)  (2nd o.)
Base  0.239  -0.194(*)  0.054  0.047(*)  0.012  0.065(*)  -0.019(**)  --  -0.183  0.614  0.173  9532
Specification(c)  (0.184)  (0.028)  (0.041)  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.019)  (0.009)  (2383)
Time Variant  0.105  -0.1  19(*)  0.024  0.060(*)  0.034(*)  0.039  -0.017(*)  --  -0.106  0.813  0.179  9532
Specification  (0.127)  (0.038)  (0.025)  (0.020)  (0.012)  (0.049)  (0.007)  (2383)
Variable* T88  -0.189  -0.1I9(***)  -0.024  0.002  -0.024  0.011  0.011  0.407  -0.220
(0.407)  (0.067)  (0.056)  (0.031)  (0.030)  (0.118)  (0.013)
Variable* T89  0.112  -0.202(**)  0.127  -0.037  -0.030  0.065  0.067(***)  0.195  -0.217
(1.134)  (0.086)  (0.221)  (0.047)  (0.089)  (0.121)  (0.036)
Variable* T90  0.311  -0.016  0.144  -0.008  -0.024  0.311  -0.026  0.875  0.055
(0.671)  (0.060)  (0.188)  (0.040)  (0.054)  (0.671)  (0.026)
Wald Test: p-  0.907  0.118  0.683  0.851  0.854  0.835  0.018
value(d)
Notes: GMM estimates  with first-differenced  data. All variables are assumed  exogenous  except  for lagged employment.  Instruments are based on the second  and further
lags of employment  and capital stocks.  (*) Significant  at the 1% level.  (**) Significant  at the 5% level. (***) Significant  at the 10% level. (a) Best point estimates
calculated  as [(Ln WBt  + Ln WBt-l )/ Ln Lt-1 ]. (b) Wald Test of Joint Significance  of the variables interacted  with a given year dummy.  (c) Time dummies  were
included but are here omitted  (d) Wald Test of Joint Significance  of year dummies  interacted  with a given variable.Table 6: Industry  Labor  Demand  for White Collar  Workers  in Mexico  (1987-90)
(standard  errors  in parenthesis)
Ln L t-l  Ln WBt  Ln WBt-l  Ln WWt  Ln WWt-l  Ln Industry  Constant  Wald  L.R.  Sargan  Autoco.  No. Obs
Value  Test:  p-  Elast.(a)  Test  Test  (Plants)
Added  value(b)  (2nd o.)
Base  0.137  0.043(**)  0.012  -0.180(*)  0.037(***)  0.034(**)  -0.011(**)  --  -0.166  0.344  0.254  9532
Specification(c)  (0.157)  (0.021)  (0.014)  (0.021)  (0.028)  (0.020)  (0.005)  (2383)
Time Variant  0.085  0.077(**)  -0.006  -0.169(*)  0.052(***)  0.050(**)  -0.009  --  -0.128  0.620  0.687  9532
Specification  (0.115)  (0.036)  (0.015)  (0.055)  (0.030)  (0.025)  (0.005)  (2383)
Variable*  T88  -0.007  -0.003  0.044  -0.022  -0.054  -0.042  0.023  0.681  -0.210
(1.287)  (0.070)  (0.090)  (0.078)  (0.184)  (0.053)  (0.015)
Variable*  T89  0.584  -0.117(**)  -0.015  -0.033  0.061  -0.067  0.071(*)  0.343  -0.268
(0.806)  (0.060)  (0.083)  (0.075)  (0.146)  (0.084)  (0.019)
Variable*  T90  0.486  -0.029  0.052  -0.019  0.071  0.026  -0.017  0.808  -0.150
(0.497)  (0.057)  (0.039)  (0.071)  (0.104)  (0.102)  (0.030)
Wald  Test:  p-  0.606  0.169  0.577  0.979  0.871  0.002  0.002
value  d)
Notes:  GMM  estimates  with first-differenced  data. All variables  are assumed  exogenous  except  for lagged  employment.  Instruments  are based  on the second  and further
lags of employment  and capital stocks.  (*) Significant  at the 1% level.  (**) Significant  at the 5% level.  (***) Significant  at the 10% level. (a) Best point estimates
calculated  as [(Ln WBt  + Ln WBt-1  )/ Ln Lt-l 1.  (b) Wald  Test of Joint Significance  of the variables  interacted  with a given  year dummy.  (c) Time dummies  were
included  but are here omitted  (d) Wald Test of Joint Significance  of year dummies  interacted  with a given variable.Table 7:Trade Openness  and Industry  Labor  Demand for Blue Collar  Workers in Chile (1982-95)
(standard  errors  in parenthesis)
Ln L t-1  Ln WBt  Ln WBt-l  Ln WWt  Ln WWt-l  Constant  Wald  Sargan  Autoco.  No. Obs
Test: p-  Test  Test  (Plants)
value(a)  (2nd o.)
Trade Policy  0.488(*)  0.005  -0.042  0.118(**)  -0.097(**)  -0.110(***)  --  0.188  0.571  21014
Specification  (0.039)  (0.106)  (0.089)  (0.051)  (0.047)  (0.057)  (1501)
Variable* Tariff Rate  0.001  0.001  -0.004(***)  -0.001  0.003(*)  0.007
(0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)
Variable* Real  0.0002  -0.002(**)  0.001(**)  -0.0004  0.0003  0.227
Exchange Rate  (0.0002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)
Wald Test: p-value(b)  0.065  0.074  0.085  0.203  0.004
Price-Cost-Margin  0.496(*)  -0.255(*)  0.149(*)  0.067(*)  -0.022  -0.183(*)  --  0.261  0.520  21014
Specification(c)  (0.054)  (0.028)  (0.033)  (0.021)  (0.026)  (0.010)  (1501)
Variable* Price  Cost  0.001(*)  0.0002  -0.001  -0.001(***)  0.0001  0.004  0.000
Margin  (0.0005)  (0.0007)  (0.0009)  (0.0006)  (0.0008)  (0.003)
Notes: GMM estimates  with first-differenced  data. Time dummies  were included  but are here omitted.  All variables are assumed exogenous  except for lagged
employment.  Instruments  are based on second  and further lags of employment  and output. (*) Significant  at the 1% level. (**) Significant at the 5% level. (***)
Significant  at the 10% level.  (a) Wald Test of Joint Significance  of the variables  interacted with a given openness  variable. (b) Wald Test of Joint Significance  of openness
variables  interacted with a given variable.  (c) Additional  Instruments:  second  and further lags of price-cost-margins.Table 8: Trade Openness  and Industry  Labor  Demand  for White Collar Workers  in Chile (1982-95)
(standard  errors  in parenthesis)
Ln L t-l  Ln WBt  Ln WBt-  I  Ln WWt  Ln WWt-  I  Constant  Wald  Sargan  Autoco.  No. Obs
Test: p-  Test  Test  (Plants)
value(a)  (2nd o.)
Trade Policy  0.256(*)  -0.072  -0.046  0.012  -0.017  0.051  --  0.193  0.669  21014
Specification  (0.052)  (0.105)  (0.100)  (0.097)  (0.071)  (0.073)  (1501)
Variable* Tariff Rate  -0.007  0.001  -0.001  0.002  0.002  0.997
(0.020)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.005)
Variable*  Real  0.001  0.001  0.0003  -0.003(*)  0.001  0.002
Exchange Rate  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)
Wald Test: p-value(b)  0.847  0.584  0.936  0.000  0.204
Price-Cost-Margin  0.215(*)  -0.097(*)  -0.038  -0.410(*)  0.220(*)  -0.074(*)  --  0.341  0.913  21014
Specification(c)  (0.040)  (0.033)  (0.036)  (0.026)  (0.037)  (0.012)  (1501)
Variable* Price Cost  0.0004  0.003(*)  -0.038  0.0007  -0.004  -0.005  0.000
Margin  (0.0005)  (0.001)  (0.036)  (0.0007)  (0.001)  (0.005)
Notes: GMM  estimates  with first-differenced  data. Time dummies  were included  but are here omitted.  All variables  are assumed  exogenous  except for lagged
employment.  Instruments are based on second  and fuirther  lags of employment  and output.  (*) Significant  at the 1% level. (**) Significant  at the 5% level.  (***)
Significant  at the 10%  level. (a) Wald Test of Joint Significance  of the variables  interacted  with a given openness  variable.  (b) Wald Test of Joint Significance  of openness
variables  interacted with a given variable.  (c) Additional  Instruments:  second  and further lags of price-cost-margins.Table 9: Trade Openness  and Industry  Labor  Demand  for Blue Collar Workers  in Colombia  (1980-91)
(standard  errors  in parenthesis)
Ln L t-1  Ln WBt  Ln WBt-  1  Ln WWt  Ln WWt-  1  Ln Industry  Constant  Wald  Sargan  Autoco.  No. Obs
Value  Test: p-  Test  Test  (Plants)
Added  value(a)  (2nd o.)
Trade Policy  0.475(*)  -0.656(*)  0.158  0.003  0.003  0.059(*)  -0.003  --  0.100  0.157  22992
Specification(b)  (0.112)  (0.170)  (0.124)  (0.075)  (0.089)  (0.018)  (0.010)  (1916)
Variable* Tariff Rate  -0.0003  0.007  -0.0002  -0.003  -0.004  0.007  0.798
(0.004)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.017)
Variable* Average  Tariff  -0.003  -0.009  0.002  0.003  0.006  0.427
(0.004)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.005)
Variable* Non-Tariff-  0.0004  -0.0004  -0.0003  0.001  -0.0003  0.298
Barriers  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)
Variable* Real  -0.001(**)  0.003(**)  -0.002(***)  -0.0001  -0.002(***)  0.029
Exchange Rate  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.0007)  (0.001)
Wald Test: p-value(c)  0.032  0.015  0.218  0.103  0.447
Trade Flows  0.031  -0.672(*)  0.098  0.201  0.215  0.043(**)  -0.012  --  0.592  0.689  22992
Specification(d)  (0.202)  (0.224)  (0.157)  (0.158)  (0.150)  (0.022)  (0.013)  (1916)
Variable* Import Ratio  -0.007(**)  -0.010  -0.006  0.008  0.005  0.031(***)  0.483
(0.004)  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.017)
Variable* Export Ratio  -0.003  -0.031(**)  0.013  0.019  0.0002  -0.004  0.473
(0.007)  (0.015)  (0.030)  (0.013)  (0.026)  (0.028)
Variable* Real  0.003  0.005(*)  -0.0004  -0.003(**)  -0.002  0.055
Exchange Rate  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.003)
Wald Test: p-value(c)  0.229  0.012  0.699  0.128  0.088  0.186
Price-Cost-Margin  0.157(**)  -0.425(*)  -0.009  0.122(***)  0.064  0.054(*)  -0.007  --  0.914  0.503  22968
Specification(e)  (0.069)  (0.058)  (0.076)  (0.064)  (0.079)  (0.013)  (0.008)  (1914)
Variable* Price  Cost  0.002(***)  0.0002  0.002  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  0.505
Margin  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.008)
Notes: GMM estimates  with first-differenced  data. Time dummies  were included  but are here omitted. All variables are assumed exogenous  except for lagged
employment.  Instruments  are based  on the second  and fuirther  lags of employment  and capital stocks.  (*) Significant  at the 1% level. (**) Significant at the 5% level.
(***) Significant  at the 10% level. (a) Wald  Test of Joint Significance  of the variables  interacted with a given openness  variable.  (b) Additional  Instrument: second  and
further lags of the tariff rate. (c) Wald Test of Joint Significance  of openness  variables  interacted with a given variable.  (d) Additional  Instruments: second lags of import
and export ratios. (e) Additional  Instruments:  second  and further lags of price-cost-margins.Table 10: Trade Openness  and Industry  Labor  Demand  for WhiteCollar  Workers  in Colombia  (1980-91)
(standard  errors in parenthesis)
Ln L t-I  Ln WBt  Ln WBt-1  Ln WWt  Ln WWt-  1  Ln Industry  Constant  Wald  Sargan  Autoco.  No. Obs
Value  Test: p-  Test  Test  (Plants)
Added  value(a)  (2nd o.)
Trade Policy  0.340(*)  -0.096  0.086  -0.484(*)  0.136(***)  0.035(**)  0.007  --  0.340  0.892  22992
Specification(b)  (0.066)  (0.090)  (0.071)  (0.098)  (0.080)  (0.015)  (0.010)  (1916)
Variable* Tariff Rate  0.001  -0.001  0.0004  -0.002  0.001  0.006  0.892
(0.003)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.009)
Variable*  Average  Tariff  -0.002  0.001  0.0005  0.004  -0.002  0.632
(0.002)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.004)
Variable*  Non-Tariff-  0.0002  0.001  -0.0003  -0.0003  -0.0001  0.778
Barriers  (0.0002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)
Variable*  Real  - 0.0004  -0.001  0.001  0.00003  0.164
Exchange  Rate  0.0005(***  (0.001)  (0.0005)  (0.001)  (0.001)
)
(0.0003)
Wald  Test: p-value(c)  0.072  0.918  0.519  0.204  0.705
Trade Flows  0.296(*)  -0.111  0.264(**)  -0.361(**)  0.058  0.068(*)  0.017  --  0.130  0.983  22992
Specification(d)  (0.074)  (0.161)  (0.131)  (0.147)  (0.131)  (0.018)  (0.012)  (1916)
Variable*  Import Ratio  0.0003  0.003  -0.018(*)  0.001  0.012(**)  0.000  0.068
(0.001)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)
Variabie*  Export Ratio  -0.003  -0.029(**)  -0.012  0.036(*)  0.004  -0.005  0.096
(0.002)  (0.013)  (0.020)  (0.012)  (0.017)  (0.015)
Variable*  Real  0.0001  0.002  0.001  -0.002  -0.001  0.375
Exchange  Rate  (0.0004)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)
Wald  Test: p-value(c)  0.496  0.097  0.028  0.005  0.056  0.940
Price-Cost-Margin  0.200(*)  0.087  0.084  -0.323(*)  0.190(**)  0.038(*)  0.012  --  0.875  0.936  22968
Specification(e)  (0.067)  (0.068)  (0.075)  (0.086)  (0.084)  (0.013)  (0.010)  (1914)
Variable*  Price  Cost  0.003(**)  -0.004(***)  -0.002  0.0007  -0.004  0.022(*)  0.004
Margin  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.007)
Notes: GMM  estimates  with first-differenced  data. Time dummies  were included but  are here omitted.  All variables  are assumed exogenous  except for lagged
employment.  Instruments are based  on the second  and further lags of employment  and capital  stocks.  (*) Significant  at the 1% level.  (**) Significant  at the 5% level.
(***)  Significant  at the 10% level. (a) Wald Test of Joint Significance  of the variables  interacted with a given openness  variable. (b) Additional Instruments:  second  and
further  lags of the tariff rate. (c) Wald Test of Joint Significance  of openness  variables  interacted with a given variable.  (d) Additional Instruments: second  lags of import
and export  ratios. (e) Additional  Instruments:  second  and further lags of price-cost-margins.Table 11: Trade Openness  and Industry  Labor  Demand  for Blue Collar  Workers in Mexico (1987-90)
(standard  errors in parenthesis)
Ln L t-l  Ln WBt  Ln WBt-l  Ln WWt  Ln WWt-l  Ln Industry  Constant  Wald  Sargan  Autoco.  No. Obs
Value  Test: p-  Test  Test  (Plants)
Added  value(a)  (2nd o.)
Trade Policy  0.475(**)  -1.002  -0.909  0.896  1.053  0.092(*)  0.001  --  0.828  0.157  8196
Specification(b)  (0.225)  (1.298)  (0.910)  (0.953)  (1.033)  (0.035)  (0.061)  (2049)
Variable*  Tariff Rate  -0.017(***)  -0.007  -0.058(**)  0.036  0.046  0.084  0.057
(0.009)  (0.047)  (0.030)  (0.036)  (0.042)  (0.099)
Variable*  Inputs Tariff  0.016(***)  0.007  0.038(**)  -0.035  -0.026  -0.091  0.034
(0.009)  (0.032)  (0.020)  (0.023)  (0.027)  (0.091)
Variable*  Non-Tariff-  0.0001  -0.001  -0.001  0.002  -0.0001  -0.001  0.111
Barriers  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.005)
Variable*  Real  0.002  0.008  0.017  -0.011  -0.016  0.122
Exchange  Rate  (0.002)  (0.018)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.015)
Wald  Test: p-value(c)  0.226  0.080  0.069  0.009  0.319  0.700
Trade Flows  2.488(*)  0.310  -0.081  -1.139(**)  0.104  0.035  -0.121(***)  --  0.299  0.727  9508
Specification(d)  (0.910)  (0.629)  (0.698)  (0.579)  (0.453)  (0.031)  (0.071)  (2377)
Variable*  Import Ratio  0.001  -0.051(***)  0.041  0.042(**)  -0.040(***)  -0.029  0.416
(0.005)  (0.027)  (0.030)  (0.020)  (0.024)  (0.067)
Variable*  Export Ratio  -0.0002  0.021  -0.036  -0.028  0.029  -0.038  0.722
(0.006)  (0.028)  (0.039)  (0.023)  (0.028)  (0.075)
Variable*  Real  -0.011(**)  0.00001  0.002  0.008(***)  0.001  0.165
Exchange Rate  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.004)
Wald Test: p-value(c)  0.150  0.107  0.401  0.155  0.159  0.053
Price-Cost-Margin  0.731(**)  0.473(***)  -0.179  0.210  0.200  0.103(**)  -0.003  --  0.863  0.399  9524
Specification(e)  (0.326)  (0.275)  (0.269)  (0.205)  (0.248)  (0.048)  (0.013)  (2381)
Variable* Price Cost  -0.003  0.009  0.009  -0.005  -0.006  0.036(***)  0.588
Margin  (0.002)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.022)
Notes: GMM  estimates with first-differenced  data. Time dummies  were included  but are here omitted.  All variables  are assumed exogenous  except for lagged
employment.  Instruments  are based on the second  and further lags of employment  and capital stocks.  (*) Significant  at the 1% level. (**) Significant  at the 5% level.
(***) Significant  at the 10% level.  (a) Wald Test of Joint Significance  of  the variables  interacted  with a given openness  variable. (b) Additional  Instrument: the second
lag of the tariff rate. (c) Wald Test of Joint Significance  of openness  variables  interacted with a given variable.  (d) Additional Instruments:  third and fuirther  lags of
import  and export  ratios. (e) Additional Instruments:  second  and further lags of price-cost-margins.Table 12: Trade Openness  and Industry  Labor  Demand  for White Collar Workers in Mexico (1987-90)
(standard errers in parenthesis)
Ln L t-I  Ln WBt  Ln WBt-l  Ln WWt  Ln WWt-l  Ln Industry  Constant  Wald  Sargan  Autoco.  No. Obs
Value  Test: p-  Test  Test  (Plants)
Added  value(a)  (2nd o.)
Trade Policy  0.372  -1.450(***)  0.214  -0.297  1.294  0.053(**)  -0.059  --  0.303  0.203  8196
Specification(b)  (0.295)  (0.860)  (0.594)  (0.462)  (0.661)  (0.027)  (0.044)  (2049)
Variable* Tariff Rate  0.003  -0.044  -0.001  -0.0002  0.040  -0.056  0.127
(0.005)  (0.030)  (0.018)  (0.016)  (0.028)  (0.060)
Variable* Inputs Tariff  -0.005  0.028  0.003  -0.004  -0.023  0.049  0.167
(0.004)  (0.021)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.018)  (0.052)
Variable*  Non-Tariff-  0.0003  0.0005  -0.0003  -0.001  0.002(**)  0.001  0.344
Barriers  (0.0003)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.003)
Variable*  Real  0.0001  0.019(***)  -0.002  0.002  -0.017(***)  0.304
Exchange  Rate  (0.002)  (0.012)  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.009)
Wald Test:  p-value(c)  0.688  0.341  0.904  0.521  0.031  0.786
Trade Flows  1.051(*)  -0.648(***)  -0.311  -0.278  0.297  0.033  -0.088(*)  --  0.610  0.665  9508
Specification(d)  (0.385)  (0.358)  (0.448)  (0.333)  (0.426)  (0.028)  (0.034)  (2377)
Variable*  Import Ratio  -0.002  0.008  -0.011  -0.001  0.017  0.054  0.744
(0.004)  (0.014)  (0.019)  (0.012)  (0.024)  (0.041)
Variable* Export Ratio  0.001  0.011  0.014  -0.011  -0.028  -0.049  0.955
(0.004)  (0.023)  (0.025)  (0.019)  (0.035)  (0.054)
Variable* Real  - 0.004  -0.002  0.002  0.004  0.058
Exchange Rate  0.004(***)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004)
(0.002)
Wald Test: p-value(c)  0.326  0.174  0.951  0.502  0.869  0.229
Price-Cost-Margin  0.185  -0.653(*)  0.606(*)  0.419(**)  -0.503(*)  0.144(*)  -0.014(**)  --  0.440  0.229  9524
Specification(e)  (0.176)  (0.251)  (0.233)  (0.190)  (0.192)  (0.040)  (0.007)  (2381)
Variable*  Price Cost  0.0001  0.021(*)  -0.018(*)  -0.019(*)  0.017(*)  -0.001  0.008
Margin  (0.001)  (0.008)  (0,007)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.  012
Notes: GMM  estimates  with first-differenced  data. Time dummmies  were included  but are here omitted. All variables are assumed exogenous  except for lagged
employment.  Instruments  are based on the second  and further lags of employment  and capital stocks.  (*) Significant  at the 1% level. (**) Significant  at the 5% level.
(***) Significant  at the 10% level.  (a) Wald Test of Joint Significance  of the variables  interacted with a given openness  variable.  (b) Additional  Instrument: the second
lag of the tariff rate. (c) Wald Test of Joint Significance  of openness  variables  interacted  with a given variable.  (d) Additional Instruments:  third and further lags of
import  and export ratios. (e) Additional Instruments:  second  and further lags of price-cost-margins.Appendix
Tables Al  to A3 contain means and standard deviations  for the samples  that were used in the
analysis.  Observations  with non-positive  values for employment,  wages or output were excluded. In
addition, odd observations were elininated when they implied large jumps in the corresponding
variables,  suggesting  reporting or recording  errors. Finally,  the plants with incomplete  information  for
the periods  considered  were also excluded,  so the final  samples  consist  of complete  and balanced  panels.Table Al: Summary  Statisticsf()  for Chilean Plants  (1981-95)
Year  Blue Collar  White Collar  Blue Collar  White  Collar  Tariff Rate  Real  Price Cost
Employment  Employment  Wages(a)  Wages(a)  (percent)  Exchange  Margin()
(per plant)  (per plant)  (per worker)  (per worker)  Rate  (percent)
(1980=100)
1981  68.1  26.6  184.9  460.6  10.0  100.0  31.2
(140.2)  (68.2)  (99.5)  (317.8)  (0.0)  (0-0)  (26.2)
1982  58.6  24.3  172.0  440.9  10.0  124.3  32.1
(125.4)  (60.4)  (95.4)  (306.7)  (0.0)  (0.0)  (26.8)
1983  59.8  23.9  129.7  338.6  17.8  133.8  31.2
(124.4)  (57.3)  (78.9)  (255.3)  (0.0)  (0.0)  (25.0)
1984  64.6  24.1  119.0  321.6  24.1  137.8  32.6
(127.6)  (54.0)  (72.8)  (250.8)  (0.0)  (0.0)  (22.9)
1985  69.0  25.6  102.1  267.2  25.7  156.2  33.5
(130.3)  (57.8)  (66.4)  (213.0)  (0.0)  (0.0)  (19.9)
1986  72.9  28.6  103.9  267.6  20.0  151.9  30.1
(131.4)  (67.5)  (72.1)  (228.8)  (0.0)  (0.0)  (23.2)
1987  79.4  31.3  102.4  251.4  20.0  148.7  32.1
(139.1)  (69.2)  (71.0)  (196.6)  (0.0)  (0.0)  (31.6)
1988  84.2  32.4  118.8  288.9  15.0  163.0  32.6
(151.4)  (66.1)  (88.3)  (217.5)  (0.0)  (0.0)  (21.1)
1989  89.4  35.6  127.7  299.5  15.0  162.0  33.6
(155.7)  (72.6)  (84.8)  (233.4)  (0.0)  (0.0)  (21.1)
1990  90.2  36.4  137.1  320.6  15.0  157.3  34.4
(157.8)  (72.5)  (92.8)  (284.0)  (0.0)  (0.0)  (20.0)
1991  91.3  36.7  144.8  339.4  13.0  148.6  34.0
(158.7)  (71.7)  (95.8)  (250.3)  (0.0)  (0.0)  (20.9)
1992  95.7  37.4  158.0  373.1  11.0  138.9  35.1
(163.7)  (77.8)  (101.3)  (263.7)  (0.0)  (0.0)  (20.4)
1993  96.4  38.7  175.9  403.5  11.0  144.7  35.5
(165.1)  (77.9)  (108.3)  (278.4)  (0.0)  (0.0)  (20.0)
1994  94.5  40.4  191.3  433.8  11.0  141.5  35.0
(159.1)  (95.2)  (111.5)  (300.1)  (0.0)  (0.0)  (22.4)
1995  91.5  40.2  203.0  450.0  11.0  128.7  34.8
(149.9)  (94.7)  (119.7)  (335.4)  (0.0)  (0.0)  (22.9)
Source:  Authors' calculations.  (*) Means with standard  deviation  in parenthesis.  (a) Thousands  of 1980  pesos. (b) Calculated  as the value of
output  minus expenditures  on labor  and materials  over output.Table A2: Summary  Statistics(')  for Colombian  Plants (1979-91)
Year  Blue Collar  White Collar  Blue Collar  White Collar  Industry  Tariff Rate  Non-Tariff  Real  Inport  Export  Price Cost
Employment  Employment  Wages(a)  Wages(a)  Value  (percent)  Barriers  Exchange  Ratio  Ratio  Margin(C)
(per plant)  (per plant)  (per worker)  (per worker)  Added(b)  (percent)  Rate  (percent)  (percent)  (percent)
(1980=100)
1979  104.6  39.6  19.7  35.4  1816.1  35.0  55.6  97.9  14.2  8.6  31.9
(201.2)  (85.6)  (10.9)  (24.1)  (1382.9)  (15.3)  (0.0)  (0.0)  (18.0)  (7.0)  (15.3)
1980  104.6  40.4  20.5  35.6  1930.0  35.0  56.0  100.0  15.7  8.5  29.4
(201.2)  (88.0)  (11.9)  (24.5)  (1455.1)  (15.3)  (0.0)  (0.0)  (19.0)  (8.0)  (15.0)
1981  101.2  40.9  21.0  36.8  1743.3  34.9  47.9  101.4  17.4  8.6  29.3
(194.8)  (88.8)  (12.3)  (25.6)  (1356.1)  (15.2)  (0.0)  (0.0)  (19.9)  (8.0)  (15.2)
1982  97.8  40.7  23.4  39.8  1791.1  35.0  45.3  96.8  16.5  7.1  27.8
(182.8)  (89.8)  (16.3)  (28.1)  (1446.7)  (15.3)  (0.0)  (0.0)  (20.2)  (6.4)  (16.2)
1983  94.3  40.6  24.9  42.4  1858.6  45.5  58.6  99.1  15.4  4.8  27.6
(175.7)  (89.0)  (15.2)  (29.6)  (1561.0)  (20.6)  (0.0)  (0.0)  (19.3)  (4.8)  (16.2)
1984  93.7  40.8  25.1  43.0  1960.4  56.4  78.9  109.6  13.4  3.9  27.4
(167.3)  (86.0)  (14.9)  (30.4)  (1625.8)  (25.4)  (0.0)  (0.0)  (17.9)  (3.3)  (14.7)
1985  88.3  40.3  24.9  41.3  2191.8  56.4  85.2  123.2  13.2  5.4  27.5
(154.2)  (81.7)  (16.6)  (29.5)  (2021.9)  (25.5)  (0.0)  (0.0)  (17.9)  (4.5)  (15.3)
1986  87.9  41.6  24.8  41.6  2611.0  56.4  57.6  133.9  13.2  6.5  27.7
(149.1)  (85.9)  (15.5)  (31.0)  (2744.1)  (25.50  (0.0)  (0.0)  (18.4)  (5.6)  (16.0)
1987  90.4  42.8  24.2  41.0  2400.4  56.3  54.7  137.2  13.5  7.9  27.9
(152.1)  (85.1)  (15.2)  (29.1)  (2168.2)  (25.4)  (0.0)  (0.0)  (18.5)  (10.1)  (16.2)
1988  90.1  44.2  24.0  41.2  2573.4  56.4  52.8  137.4  14.0  9.3  29.0
(154.2)  (86.3)  (14.8)  (29.1)  (2369.1)  (25.4)  (0.0)  (0.0)  (18.4)  (14.2)  (16.1)
1989  89.4  45.2  24.6  42.2  2725.5  37.1  55.3  143.8  14.1  11.2  28.8
(150.1)  (91.0)  (15.6)  (30.4)  (2631.9)  (13.3)  (0.0)  (0.0)  (18.9)  (17.0)  (16.5)
1990  89.2  46.4  24.8  43.3  2902.9  31.6  38.3  154.4  15.9  14.0  29.3
(151.0)  (92.7)  (16.0)  (31.5)  (2804.6)  (9.1)  (0.0)  (0.0)  (20.1)  (21.9)  (16.3)
1991  89.9  47.5  24.9  44.2  2873.5  31.6  9.5  152.8  27.1  18.7  29.8
(155.6)  (94.8)  (16.6)  (32.2)  (2649.4)  (9.1)  (0.0)  (0.0)  (43.2)  (27.9)  (16.7)
Source:  Authors' calculations. (*) Means with standard deviation in parenthesis. (a) Thousands of pesos (constant prices). (b) Millions of pesos (constant prices). (c)
Calculated  as the value  of output minus expenditures  on labor  and materials  over output.Table A3: Summary Statisticsl')  for Mexican Plants (1986-90)
Year  Blue Collar  White Collar  Blue Collar  White Collar  Industry  Output  InputTariff  Non-Tariff  Real  Imnport  Export  Price Cost
Employment  Employment  Wages(a)  Wages(8)  Value  Tariff Rate  Rate  Barriers  Exchange  Ratio  Ratio  Margin(')
(per plant)  (per plant)  (per worker)  (per worker)  Added(b)  (percent)  (percent)  (percent)  Rate  (percent)  (percent)  (percent)
(1984=100)
1986  246.4  104.1  63.7  124.2  27.9  32.5  24.3  33.0  121.8  19.5  16.7  32.0
(521.8)  (184.6)  (27.0)  (64.1)  (19.8)  (11.2)  (7.8)  (39.5)  (0.0)  (24.5)  (21.5)  (24.4)
1987  243.5  103.9  58.2  114.5  28.4  31.0  23.0  18.7  119.5  13.4  11.2  33.2
(508.3)  (182.8)  (26.3)  (62.5)  (20.5)  (8.4)  (7.2)  (33.4)  (0.0)  (16.8)  (12.9)  (25.2)
1988  245.2  105.0  56.5  116.4  29.9  15.0  10.1  4.0  98.6  14.2  9.8  33.1
(494.4)  (181.8)  (28.6)  (70.6)  (22.8)  (4.8)  (3.4)  (15.1)  (0.0)  (15.3)  (9.5)  (22.0)
1989  253.1  106.6  65.9  150.1  36.4  15.4  11.9  3.1  96.6  16.4  11.9  32.9
(513.4)  (188.1)  (35.0)  (137.3)  (27.5)  (3.7)  (2.2)  (14.3)  (0.0)  (16.1)  (10.4)  (25.2)
1990  257.3  106.7  72.7  181.0  40.4  15.5  11.8  2.7  92.7  17.5  9.5  31.3
(548.6)  (187.8)  (42.6)  (128.3)  (31.2)  (3.7)  (2.3)  (13.6)  (0.0)  (16.3)  (10.4)  (29.7)
Source: Authors'  calculations. (*) Means with standard deviation in parenthesis. (a) Thousands of 1980 pesos. (b) Billions of 1980 pesos. (c) Calculated as the value of
output minus expenditures on labor and materials over output.Policy  Research Working Paper  Series
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